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This paper analyzes the contributions of monetary and fiscal policy to postwar economic
recoveries. We find that the Federal Reserve typically responds to downturns with prompt and
large reductions in interest rates. Discretionary fiscal policy, in contrast, rarely reacts before the
trough in economic activity, and even then the responses are usually small. Simulations using
multipliers from both simple regressions and a large macroeconomic model show that the interest
rate falls account for nearly all of the above-average growth that occurs early in recoveries. Our
estimates also indicate that on several occasions expansionary policies have contributed
substantially to above-normal growth outside of recoveries. Fmally, the results suggest that the
persistence of aggregate output movements is largely the result of the extreme persistence of the
contribution of policy changes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Employment Act of 1946 set as the goal of government
economic policy the maintenance of reasonably full employment and stable
prices. Yet, nearly fiftyyearslater, economists seem strangely unsure about
what to tell policy-makers to do to end recessions. One source of this
uncertainty is confusion about how macroeconomic policies have actually
been ued to combat recessions. In the midst of the most recent recession,
one heard opinions of fiscal policy ranging from the view that no recession
has ever ended without fiscal expansion to the view that fiscal stimulus has
always come too late. Similarly, for monetary policy there was disagreement
about whether looser policy has been a primary engine of recovery from
recessions or whether it has been relatively unimportant in these periods.
This paper seeks to fill in this gap in economists' knowledge by
analyzing what has ended the eight recessions that have occurred in the
United States since 1950. In particular, it analyzes whether monetary and
fiscal policy have helped or hindered previous recoveries. By quantifying the
role of policy, the paper seeks to identify how much of recoveries is
attributable to government action, and how much to other factors such as2
self-correction and fortuitous shocks. By determining which policies were
the most effective in ending past recessions, the paper tries to discern the
likely efficacy of policy today and in recessions to come.
Our main fmding is that monetary policy has been the source of
most postwar recoveries. While limited fiscal actions have occurred around
most troughs, these actions have almost always been too small to contribute
much to economic recovery. In contrast, monetary policy has typically
moved toward expansion shortly after the start of most recessions and
appears to have contributed, on average, almost two percentage points to
real GDP growth in the four quarters following the trough. Even accounting
for the fact that tight monetary policy before the peak continues todepress
the economy for several years, the net effect of monetary policy in ending
recessions has been substantial.
We reach this conclusion through a series of steps. Section II
analyzes the record of policy actions since 1950. It shows that both nominal
and real interest rates fell by several percentage points before mosttroughs.
In contrast, the ratio of the high-employment surplus to trend GDPtypically
fell slightly around troughs, but only rarely movedmore than a percentage
point.
Section III analyzes the sources of these policy changes.It
examines the stated motivations of policy-makers tosee if the changes in
interest rates and in the high-employmentsurplus during recessions and
around troughs were taken largely to end the recessionsor for other
reasons. We find that nearly all of the monetary changes and most of the
fiscal changes were genuinely anti-recessionary.Interestingly, we find that
many of the largest discretionary fiscal actions taken in the postwar era, such3
as the 1964 tax cut and the Nixon "New Economic Policy," were not anti-
recessionary measures, but expansionary actions taken when policy-makers
were dissatisfied with the pace of growth.
Section IV examines the likely effects of the anti-recessionary
actions we identify. Using estimates of the effects of policy both from our
own regressions and from Data Resources Incorporated's forecasting model,
we estimate the contributions of monetary and fiscal policy to recessions and
recoveries. Although there is substantial variation in the estimates of
policies' impact, the results suggest that monetary policy has been crucial in
ending recessions, while fiscal policy has contributed very little.1
Section V investigates two additional issues raised by our analysis.
The first issue is the overall stabilization record of policy. We argue that
there is little evidence that discretionary policy has had a large stabilizing
influence, and that there are several important episodes in which
expansionary policy has exacerbated fluctuations. The second issue is the
persistence of output movements. We fmd that the component of
fluctuations that is due to shifts in monetary and fiscal policy is highly
persistent and accounts for a large part of the persistence of overall output
movements.
1Perry and Schultze (1993) also investigate the sources of recoveries.
They reach conclusions generally similar to ours.4
II. POLICY ACTIONS IN RECESSIONS AND RECOVERIES
A. Indicators of Policy
To analyze whether policy could account for recoveries, it is
necessary to examine the behavior of policy during recessions and recoveries.
We examine two indicators of monetary policy. The first is simply the
quarterly change in the nominal federal funds rate.2 Throughout much of
the postwar period, the federal funds rate has been the primary proximate
instrument of monetary policy. And even during periods when it wasnot,
such as the 1950s and 1979-82, the Federal Reserve placed considerable
emphasis on "money market conditions" --thatis, changes in nominal
interest rates --insetting policy. Cook and Hahn (1989) and Bernanke and
Blinder (1992) document that the Federal Reservecan control the federal
funds rate in the short run, and Bernanke and Blinderpresent a variety of
evidence that innovations in the funds rate are largely due tochanges in
monetary policy.
Our second indicator of monetary policy is the estimatedchange in
the real funds rate. Theory predicts that it is the real rather thanthe
nominal rate that is relevant for economicactivity.The fact that
expansionary monetary policy lowers nominal interest rates stronglysuggests
that the Federal Reserve influences real rates. But sinceexpected inflation
may change systematically over the course of recessions and recoveries, it is
2UthesS otherwisenoted, all data are from Citibase (Dec. 1993 update).
The federal funds rate data for 1950-54are described in Romer and Romer
(1993).5
important to explicitly examine the behaviorof real rates.
Our procedure for estimating the real funds rate followsMishkin
(1981). We first compute the ex post real rate asthe difference between the
nominal rate and the change in the logarithm of the GDPdeflator.3 We
then regress the cx post real rate on a constant, a time trend, the current
and the first four lagged values of the nominal rate, and the first four lags
of inflation and real GDP growth.4 The sample period is 1951:1 to 1993:2.
The estimated values of the cx ante real rate are the fitted values of this
regression. Figure 1 shows our estimates of the cx antereal federal funds
rate, along with the nominal rate.
Our measure of discretionary fiscal policy is the change in the ratio
of the high-employment surplus to trend or potentialGDP.5 This measure
is shown in Figure 2. The rationale for using the high-employment surplus
is the standard one that it adjusts for the impact of economic activity on
Because the federal funds rate is a very short-term rate, the relevant
inflation rate for computing the real rate for a quarter is inflation within that
quarter. We therefore compute the cx postreal rate for quarter t as i -
4[ln((Pt÷i+Pt)/2) -ln((P-1-Pt.i)/2)], where i is the nominal funds rate and
P is the GDP deflator.
'Toprevent the period-t value of the GDP deflatorfrom entering the
first lag of inflation, the lagged values of inflation are computed simply as
4[ln(Pi) -111(Pt2)1U(-2) - 1"(t-3)1andso on, rather than in the
more complex way used to calculate current inflationdescribed in n. 3.
Using the more complex definition has essentially no effect onthe estimated
real interest rate series.
For the period since 1955, the data are from the Congressional Budget
Office. The data for 1950-54 are described in Carlson (1987).6
receipts and expenditures. Because of this adjustment, the high-employment
surplus can differentiate fiscal actions taken deliberately in response to
recessions from those that occur automatically. The high-employment
surplus, however, is not a perfect measure of discretionary fiscal changes
because some actions may have more or less effect on the economy than
their impact on the high-employment surplus would suggest. Therefore, in
the analysis of fiscal policy in the next two sections, we discuss temporary tax
changes, investment tax credits, and other factors that might cause the
change in the high-employment surplus to be a misleading measure of the
expansionary stance of fiscal policy.
Although it is useful to separate out the automatic changes in the
surplus that are caused by economic activity from the discretionary changes,
the automatic changes are nevertheless interesting. It is certainly possible,
for example, that automatic stabilizers are important to recoveries. For this
reason we also examine the change in the ratio of the automatic surplus to
trend GDP; we measure the automatic component of the surplus simply as
the difference between the actual surplus and the high-employment
surplus.6
B. Results
Monetary Policy. Table 1 reports the behavior of the federal funds
rate during recessions --specifically,from the times of peaks in real GDP
6Forthe actual budget surplus, we use the National Income and
Product Accounts measure of the federal surplus.7
to the quarter after troughs.7 The top half of the tableshows the change
in the nominal rate; the bottom half shows the change in the real rate.
The table shows that interest rates fall sharply in recessions. The
falls in the nominal funds rate are particularly consistent: 28 of the 33
entries in the top portion of the table are negative. The only significant
exception to the pattern of falling nominal rates occurredin 1974, when the
Federal Reserve moved to sharply tighter policy even though real output was
falling. Even during this recession, however, the overall movementin the
funds rate was a large decline. The average decline between the peakin
output and one quarter after the troughis 3.4 percentage points. For
comparison, the standard deviation of movements in thenominal funds rate
for the full sample is 1.0 percentage points for one-quarter changes, and 2.3
percentage points for four-quarter changes.Thus the declines in recessions
are large.
The bottom half of the table shows that real interest rates also fell
during these recessions. In all eight episodes, theestimated real rate fell
between the peak and the quarter after the trough. The declines in thereal
rate are somewhat smaller and less consistent than the falls in thenominal
rate, however. For example, the average declineis just slightly over 2
percentage points.8
Because our focus is on movements in aggregate output, we use the
dates of the peaks and troughs in real GDP rather than NBER peaksand
troughs. The two sets of dates are very similar, however.
8SectionIV.C shows that the declines in output, prices, and expected
inflation during recessions relative to their normal behavior wouldhave
caused only small falls in nominal interest rates, and essentially no change8
Once a recovery has begun, there is a moderate tendency for both
the nominal and real funds rates to rise. Table 2 shows the changes in the
nominal and real federal funds rates in the second through fifth quarters
after troughs. About two-thirds of these entries are positive, with anaverage
rise of both the nominal and the real rate during these periods of about one
percentage point. And although the relevant numbers are not reported in
the tables, the same general tendency toward moderate interest rate
increases continues through the second year of recoveries. Table 2 also
shows that the 1991 experience is quite unusual. Rather than rising as is
typical, both real and nominal rates fell substantially after the trough.
This examination of movements in interest rates suggests that
monetary policy could play a critical role in recoveries: there are large,
consistent declines in interest rates during recessions. Whether these
declines reflect deliberate countercycical policy, and whether their timing
and magnitude are consistent with the view that they are important in
recoveries, are questions that we address in the next two sections.
Fiscal Policy. Table 3 reports the change in the ratio of the high-
employment surplus to trend GDP from peaks to five quarters after troughs.
These data do not show any pattern of discretionary fiscal policyas
consistent or strong as the declines in interest rates in recessions. The
average cumulative change in the high-employment surplus to GDP ratio
in real rates, if the Federal Reserve hadkept the money growth rate fixed
in the face of these movements. Thuseven if we adopted measures of
monetary policy that did not attribute these parts of changes in interest rates
to policy, we would still find that monetary policy was the source of the bulk
of the interest rate declines.9
from the peak to one quarter after the trough is -0.7 percentage points.
However, there is great variation around this average, with some cumulative
changes being large and positive, and others being large and negative. To
put the average change in perspective, the standarddeviation of movements
in the high-employment surplus to GDP ratio for the full sample is 0.6
percentage points for one-quarter changes and 1.1 percentage pointsfor
four-quarter changes. Thus the average fall during recessions is not large
relative to typical movements in the high-employment surplus to GD? ratio.
To the extent that there is any systematic pattern in deliberate fiscal
policy, it is that policy is generally expansionary around troughs. For
example, in every recession except the one immediately after the Korean
War, the ratio of the high-employment surplus to GDP fell between two
quarters before the trough and the quarter after the trough;19 of the 24
individual changes for these quarters were negative. The overall shifts over
these three quarters were generally about one percent of GDP. Thus it
does appear that fiscal policy becomes slightly expansionary late in
recessions.
The record of automatic fiscal policy is decidedly more promising
than that of discretionary fiscal policy. Table 4 shows the change in the
automatic surplus to GD? ratio around the eight troughs since 1950. As
would be expected, the automatic surplus to GDP ratio consistently declines
during recessions. These automatic falls in the surplus are moderately large;
the average cumulative decline in the automatic surplus to GDP ratio from
the peak to the quarter after the trough is 1.6 percentage points. For
comparison, the standard deviation of changes in the automatic surplus to
GDP ratio is 0.3 percentage points for one-quarter changes and 0.910
percentage points for four-quarter changes.
This simple examination of the data suggests that automatic fiscal
policy is more likely to have affected recoveries than has discretionary policy.
Unless the effects of modest changes in deliberate fiscal policy are large or
there are consistently important shifts in fiscal policy that are not reflected
in the high-employment surplus, discretionary fiscal policy cannot have
played a central role in ending downturns or in creating strong recoveries.
On the other hand, the automatic movements in the surplus during
recessions may be large enough and consistent enough to have significantly
affected the path of real output following troughs.
Despite this negative conclusion on the overall movement of
discretionary fiscal policy during recessions, the finding that discretionary
fiscal policy is consistently expansionary around troughs is intriguing. If
these expansions are in fact responses to economic conditions, they would
suggest that deliberate fiscal policy may play some role in recoveries. More
important, they raise the possibility that if such expansions were only
undertaken more aggressively, fiscal policy could be a significant
countercyclical tool. The key issues are the motives for the shifts in policy,
the reasons they are not larger, and the timing of their effects. It is to these
issues that we now turn.
III. MOTNATIONS FOR POLICY ACTIONS
This section analyzes the nature and motivation of the policy actions
behind the movements in interest rates and thehigh-employment surplus11
described in the previous section. This analysis is crucially important
because our policy indicators could move for reasons other than anti-
recessionary policy.Interest rates, for example, could decline during
recessions if the Federal Reserve were targeting money growth and simply
allowed rates to fall as declines in real activity reduced money demand.
They could also fall if the Federal Reserve were targeting interest rates but
changed them in response to international or fmancial-market developments
rather than in response to recessions. Similarly, the high-employment
surplus could fall because of military actions or other spending changes
unrelated to the state of the economy. Only by analyzing the motivations of
policy-makers can we determine whether the movements in interest rates
and the high-employment surplus during recessions were the result of
deliberate anti-recessionary policy.
A. Monetary Policy
The records of the Federal Reserve provide ample evidence that the
falls in interest rates before recoveries are the result of deliberate anti-
recessionary policy. Boschen and Mills (1992) provide a monthly index of
the Federal Reserve's intentions based on the Record of Policy Actions of
the Federal Open Market Committee. Their index classifies intentions on
a scale from -2 to +2,with -2 indicating a strong emphasis on inflation
reduction and +2 indicating a strong emphasis on real growth. Table 5
showsthe change in the Boschen-Mills index from the peak in economic
activity to five quarters after the trough. (Most of the values are in fractions
because we have converted the monthly series to quarterly values to be
consistent with our other indicators.)12
The most obvious message of Table 5isthat monetary policy
typically changes toward an emphasis on real growth very soon after the
peak in real GDP. Without exception, the change in the Boschen-Mils
index is positive within two quarters of the peak. In many cases the change
occurs concurrent with or even slightly before the peak in output. This
pattern obviously parallels the fmding in Section II that interest rates fall
soon after the peak in most cases. The behavior of the Boschen-Mills index
indicates that the Federal Reserve typically responds to weakness in the
economy quite rapidly, and that the declines in interest rates are generally
the result of deliberate monetary policy.
Table 5alsoshows that the emphasis of monetary policy typically
changes soon after the trough. In every recession analyzed by Boschen and
Mills, monetary policy turned contractionary within two or three quarters of
the low point in real output. This again suggests that the rises in interest
rates after troughs described in Section II are the result of deliberate
Federal Reserve policy?
1. EDisodes
The Boschen and Mills index, whilevery useful, is not perfect for
our purposes because it does not consider the Federal Reserve's perceptions
It is important to note that although Boschen and Mills find that
concern about inflation became the main motivational factor for the Federal
Reserve after each trough, inflation itself does not consistently rise in the
early stages of the recoveries. To the extent that there is a pattern, the
inflation rate (measured as thepercentage change in the GDP deflator)
generally falls during the first two years of recoveries, though most of this
effect is due to the first quarter after the trough.13
of the state of the economy.10 It therefore does not distinguish between
times when the Federal Reserve is counteracting a recession and, for
example, times when it believes the economy is growing normallybut desires
even faster growth. For this reason, it is useful to supplementBoschen and
Mills's analysis with an independent reading of the Record of Policy Actions
of the Federal Open Market Committee and the Minutes of the FOMC
during recessions.11
1953. The Federal Reserve was very quick to perceive the
weakening of the economy in 1953. In retrospect, we know that the peakin
real GDP occurred in the second quarter of 1953. Yet as early as the June
11, 1953 meeting, one member of the FOMC expressed the opinionthat "the
economy was cresting" (Minutes, 6/11/53, p. 50). Throughoutthe fall, the
economic conditions reviewed by the Board indicated that the economy was
relatively stable, but with "indications of reductions in demandin some
important sectors" (Minutes, 9/8/53, p. 2). By December, however,the
FOMC felt that "the decline in economic conditions, though moderate, was
unmistakable" (1953, p. 102). The FOMC began to loosen policy in the
summer of 1953. The FOMC initially aimed merely to endthe previous
policy of monetary contraction, but by September 1953 theyhad adopted a
10 Thespeed with which the Federal Reserve recognizes recessionshas
been analyzed by other researchers. See, for example, Hinshaw (1968),
Karaken and Solow (1963), and Brunner and Meltzer (1964).
The Records of Policy Actions for each year are compiled in the
Annual Reports of the Board of Governors. Citations to this source are
only identified by the year and page number. Citations to theMinutes are
identified by the title, date, and page number.14
program of "active ease." The motivations for this policy were summed up
by one member who stated that:
the System should be trying to build factors which would
offset any down-turn in the economy ....[Thus]it would be
desirable to pursue a policy of active ease by putting
reserves liberally into the market (Minutes, 9/8/53, p. 11).
This switch to anti-recessionary policy is also indicated by the decision to
remove any mention of inflation from the directive, leaving as the primary
goal of open market operations "avoiding deflationary tendencies" (Minutes,
9/24/53, p. 29).12
1957. Monetary policy in 1957 was almost identical to that in 1953.
Once again, the Federal Reserve perceived the downturn immediately.
While the peak in real GDP occurred in the third quarter of 1957, the
records of the Federal Reserve show that as of the October 1, 1957 meeting
the FOMC noted that "an increasing number of business observers were
suggesting ...thatthe prospective movement in activity was a decline" (1957,
p. 51). By the November 12 meeting, the FOMC perceived that "there no
longer was much doubt that at least a mild downturn in business activity was
under way" (1957, p. 56). In response to the decline, on November 12 the
FOMC changed its policy directive
to eliminate the previous clause (b) which had called for
restraining inflationary pressures and to replace that clause
12Technicalconsiderations involving seasonal demand for reserves and
Treasury fmancing operations had some effect on the exact timing of the
easing over this period. Specifically, these considerations appear to have led
the FOMC to ease slightly more in June and September, and slightly less in
December.15
with wording that provided for open market operations
with a view ..."tofostering sustainable growth in the
economy without inflation by moderatingthe pressures on
bank reserves" (1957, p. 56).
The motivation for this change was summed up by Vice Chairman Hayes,
who stated that "relaxing credit restraint ...seemsdesirable in view of the
possibility, however remote, that the business adjustment may be more than
a mild dip" (Minutes, 11/12/57, p. 18). Thus monetary policy was clearly
anti-recessionary in this episode.
1960. The changes in monetary policy during the 1960 recession
were motivated largely by a belief that economic activity was roughly
constant or increasing slightly, not by perceptions that the economy was in
a recession. While the peak in real GDP occurred in the first quarterof
1960, as late as July 1960 the FOMC's perception was only that "little
upward momentum was evident, ...anduncertainty regarding future trends
continued to be widespread" (1960, p. 58).The Federal Reserve
nevertheless moved to lower interest rates repeatedly over the first nine
months of the year in order to increase real growth. For example, in May
the FOMC felt that the "lack of exuberance in the business picture
justified moving modestly in the direction of increasing the supplyof
reserves available to the banking system" (1960, p. 53). It was notuntil
November that the FOMC realized that a recession was under way (1960,
pp. 70-71). By that time, however, balanceof payments considerations
prevented further easing. Thus the declines in interest rates over this period
were largely the result of shifts in policy in response to newsabout real
output, but were not truly anti-recessionary.
1969. Real output reached its peak in the fourth quarter of 1969.16
Over the last several months of 1969, the Federal Reserve gradually revised
its forecast of short-run growth downward to the point where its expectation
was that growth would be approximately zero over the next several quarters.
Concern about the high level of inflation, however, kept the FOMC from
shifting to easier policy (see, for example, 1970, p. 96). By February 1970
the forecast had been revised to predict negative growth; as a result, the
FOMC "concluded that, in light of the latest economic developments and the
current business outlook, it was appropriate to move gradually toward
somewhat less restraint" (1970, p. 103). The stance of policy actually shifted
only slightly over the next several months, however. But beginning in May,
the FOMC moved consistently toward easier policy. In May and June, this
shift was to some extent a response to "strains" in financial markets.
Throughout the second half of the year, however, the easing was a response
to the weak state of the economy and a perception that inflation was
moderating. In August, for example, the FOMC felt that
expectationsof continuinginflation had abated
considerably ....Itwas the consensus of the Committee
that monetary policy at present should be sufficiently
stimulative to foster moderate growth in real economic
activity ....Againstthis background, the Committee
decided that open market operations should be directed at
promoting some easing of conditions in credit markets
(1970, p. 149).
Thus the falls in interest rates during the 1969 recessionwere largely the
result of deliberate anti-recessionary policies.
1973. Beginning in roughly February 1974, the Federal Reserve
expected real output to fall in the first quarter and then to stay essentially
unchanged (see, for example, 1974, pp. 137, 144). While thissuggests that17
the Federal Reserve was quick to discern the onset of recession, which we
now date as having begun with the peak in the fourth quarter of 1973,it was
slow to realize its severity. It was not until the October 14 FOMC meeting
that the System acknowledged that there would be an extended decline in
real activity (1974, P. 207). As in 1969-70, concern about inflation prevented
the Federal Reserve from loosening significantly during the early part of the
recession, and in fact led to considerable tightening in the spring of 1974
(see, for example, 1974, pp. 107, 161). Beginning in September, however,
the FOMC began to move to ease policy significantly. This easing was
clearly a response to the recession; for example, the summary of actions by
the Board of Governors in September through November states that
the Board felt that the weakening tendencies in the
economy should be countered initially throughthe use of
monetary policy instruments other than the discount rate.
To this end, System open market operations became
increasingly less restrictive as the fall progressed (1974,
pp. 109-110; see also pp. 202-203, 211, 213, 225).
These anti-recessionary policies continued into the first part of 1975 (see for
example 1975, pp. 142-143).
1980. At every meeting of the FOMC from July 1979 through the
summer of 1980, the Federal Reserve believed that a recession waseither
under way or was imminent. Concern about inflation and money growth,
however, prevented policy-makers from moving to lower interest ratesuntil
the spring of 1980. Beginning in April 1980, just after the actual peak in
real GDP in the first quarter of 1980, the combination of weak money
growth and unfavorable news about real output caused the FOMC tolower
the federal funds rate sharply. The FOMC did not want to "exacerbate18
recessionary tendencies in the economy" and was concerned about "the risk
that the contraction would prove to be deeper than was widely expected"
(1980, pp. 117, 122).
1981.RealGDP peaked in the third quarter of 1981. As early as
November, "the consensus [of the FOMC] was that the downward drift in
economic activity apparent when the Committee met in early October had
clearly developed into a recession" (1981, p. 136). The major declines in
interest rates occurred in the fourth quarter of 1981 and in the third and
fourth quarters of 1982. The declines in late 1981, like those in the spring
of 1980, were partly a response to weak money growth and partly a direct
response to the recession. By July 1982, the FOMC wanted "to provide
sufficient monetary growth to encourage recovery in economic activity over
the months ahead" (1982, pp. 109-110). FOMC members stressed "the need
for flexibility in interpreting the behavior of the monetary aggregates," and
felt that money growth "near, or for a time somewhat above, the upper ends
of [the target] ranges would be acceptable" (1982, p. 111). Although concern
with the growth of monetary aggregates was an important motive in
monetary policy over this period, direct concern about real activity and the
effects of the recession on the fmancial system was important as well.
1990. In the most recent recession the Federal Reserve began to
worry about a downturn long before it occurred. As early as December
1989, the FOMC viewed "the risks of a shortfall in economic activity as
sufficiently high to justify an immediate move to slightly easier reserve
conditions" (1989, pp. 135-136). In July 1990, immediately after what we
now know was the peak in real GDP, the FOMC expected "sustained but
subdued growth in economic activity...forthe next several quarters" (1990,19
p. 120). In response they calledfor "some easing fairly soon unless incoming
indicators indicated appreciably stronger monetary growth and greater
inflationary pressures than the members currently expected" (1990, p. 126).
While the Federal Reserve was quick to worry about recession, it
was fairly slow to realize that a recession was actually in progress duringthe
fall of 1990. In October the FOMC believed that "the available data do not
point to cumulating weakness and the onset of a recession" (1990, p. 139).
They nevertheless felt that "an easing move was warranted in lightof
indications that there was a significant risk of a much weaker economy"
(1990, p. 141). Not until November did a consensus develop that "the most
likely outcome was a relatively mild and brief downturn" (1990, p. 148). At
this point, the FOMC voted for some slight immediate easing of reserve
conditions and indicated that "the growing signs of a softening economy
suggested that the Committee should remain alert ...tosignals that some
further easing was appropriate" (1990, p. 149). Thus it appears that,
although the falls in interest rates throughout 1990 weremotivated by
movements in real output, only those after November 1990 were trulyanti-
recessionary.
2. Lessons from Postwar Monetary Policy
This analysis of the motivations for policy suggests that monetary
policy can respond quickly to changes in economic conditions.The Federal
Reserve has almost always recognized that a recession was underway very
rapidly. Only in 1960 and 1990 was there a lag of more than one quarter
between the peak and when the Federal Reserve perceived a downturn.
And even in these two instances the Federal Reserve loosened in response20
to what it perceived as merely slow growth.
In most instances the Federal Reserve responded to the weakening
economy by increasing reserves immediately. This suggests that the declines
in interest rates during recessions documented in Section II were at least
partly the result of anti-recessionary monetary policy. In those instances
where policy-makers did not cut interest rates in response to the weakening
of the economy, it was typically because some other factor, such as inflation
or balance of payments difficulties, was thought to necessitate tight policy.
The fact that the Boschen and Mills index of Federal Reserve
intentions shows a move toward inflation control soon after the start of most
recoveries is also important. It suggests that most periods of high inflation
are not the result of anti-recessionary monetary policy carried too far.
Rather, they are more likely the result of expansionary policies taken for
reasons unrelated to recessions or of insufficient shifts toward combating
inflation once recoveries have begun. Thus policy mistakes are not an
inherent feature of anti-recessionary monetary policy.
B. Fiscal Policy
Our primary source for the history offiscal policy is the Economic
Report of the President. published biennially from 1948 to 1952 and then
annually from 1953 through the present. The Economic Reports contain
detailed descriptions and justifications of the President's fiscal policy
recommendations.They also summarize the fiscal policies actually
implemented in the preceding year. If the policies implemented differ from
those previously recommended by the Administration, some discussion or
critique of Congress's motives is usually given. As a result, the Economic21
Reports provide unique insight into both the motivation for policy and the
lags in taking fiscal actions.13
1. Episodes
1953. The end of the Korean War caused a substantial decline in
government spending in 1953. When a recession began in the second
quarter of 1953, the Eisenhower administration did not take any noticeable
steps to increase spending. It did, however, move to reduce taxes shortly
before the trough of the recession in the second quarter of 1954. In January
1954 an extensive tax cut went into effect that reduced taxes during the first
six months of 1954 by $1.1 billion, or about 0.6% of GDP over this period
(1955, p. 19). This tax cut eliminated two wartime tax increases: the excess
profits tax passed in 1950, and the personal and corporate income tax
increases put into place in 1951.
Whether this fiscal action was truly anti-recessionary is ambiguous
because the original legislation called for the excess profits tax to expire on
June 30, 1953 and the personal income tax increase to be rescinded on
December 31, 1953. Three pieces of evidence, however, suggest that it was
largely discretionary. First, the excess profits tax was extended for six
months early in 1953 at the urging of President Eisenhower, who felt that
a tax cut in mid-1953 would be inflationary. Second, the 1953 Economic
Report includes among its 1954 budget deficit projections, the situation that
would occur "if the post-Korea tax increases are not allowed to run off as
13Unlessotherwise noted, all citations in this section refer to the
Economic Reports.22
provided by present law" (1953, p. 71). This suggests that the Truman
administration thought an extension of the wartime taxes was a likely
outcome. Finally, the Eisenhower Economic Report of 1954 treats the tax
decrease as an important anti-recessionary act. It states:
The Secretary of the Treasury therefore announced in the
plainest possible language that the Administration, besides
relinquishing the excess-profits tax, would not seek to
postpone the reduction of the personal income tax,
averaging approximately 10 percent, scheduled for January
1, 1954. This unequivocal promise of tax relief to both
families and business firms bolstered confidence at a time
when trade and employment were slipping slightly. In
coming months these well-timed tax reductions are likely
to give substantial support to consumer and investment
markets (1954, p. 52).
Even if the tax reduction was discretionary, it is obvious that this is an
unusual case. The President rarely has a tax cut passed and waiting prior
to the onset of recession. Thus there was more flexibility in fiscal policy in
1953 than at almost any other time.14
1957. The 1957 recession began in the third quarter of 1957. The
only significant fiscal change that occurred soon after the onset of the
recession was an acceleration of defense spending. The Eisenhower
administration accelerated the placement of defense contracts, and in
January 1958 requested supplemental appropriations of $1.3 billion from
14Despite the reduction in taxes, the high-employment surplus to GDP
ratio actually rose slightly in 1954 because of an even greater reduction in
spending. However, since the decline in expenditures reflected both external
shocks and long-term national security planning, it seems reasonable to view
fiscal policy as quite expansionary in 1954 relative to likely alternatives.23
Congress as an advance on 1959 spending. Although theAdministration
stressed that national security was the main motivation for these actions, it
was quick to point out the economic benefits. For example, the 1958
Economic Report states:
At the turn of the year, the economy was beginning to feel
the effects of an acceleration of the placement of defense
contract awards, prompted by the need to move forward
quickly with programs essential to the strengthening of the
Nation's defenses (1958, p. 8).
The frequent references to the economic benefits of this spending suggests
that at least some of the motivation was anti-recessionary.
The 1959 Economic Report indicates that similar types of spending
acceleration were undertaken around the trough in the first quarter of 1958.
In March and April 1958, spending on federal programs for building
airports, hospitals, and other public buildings was moved forward. In April
1958, legislation was passed to increase spending on the interstate highway
program (1959, pp. 41-42). Both of these measures wereconsistent with the
Eisenhower philosophy that
the major emphasis of Federal countercyclical policy
should be placed on measures that will result in prompt
action ....Thougha useful contribution can be made by the
acceleration of public works projects that are already under
way or are ready to be started, little reliance canbe placed
on large undertakings which ...canbe put into operation
only after an extended interval of planning" (1959, p. 2).
In addition to these measures, Congress passed, at the Administration's
request, a temporary extension of unemployment benefitsin June 1958
(1959, p. 40). Several minor spending bills passed in July 1958 werealso
taken at least partly in response to the state of the economy (Bartlett, 1993).24
1960. Real GDP peaked in the first quarter of 1960. The 1961
EcOnomic Report indicates that no significant anti-recessionary fiscal actions
were taken before the trough in the fourth quarter of 1960. Numerous
actions, however, were taken in the quarter just after the turning point in
GDP. The first Kennedy administration Economic Report in January 1962
reports that "immediately upon taking office, the new Administration moved
vigorously to use the fiscal powers of the Federal Government to help bring
about economic recovery" (1962, p. 82). Among the measures proposed and
quickly passed were an acceleration of federal procurement and tax refunds,
changes in transfer programs that added $2 billion to transfer payments over
fiscal years 1961 and 1962 combined, and the Temporary Extended
Unemployment Compensation Act, which extended coverage.15 Despite
this flurry of activity, the total amount spent under these programs was quite
small.
An investment tax credit equal to 7% of gross investment in
depreciable machinery and equipment was also proposed early in the
Kennedy administration, and was passed in October 1962. Interestingly, this
action is discussed in the chapter of the Economic Report on policies to
encourage economic growth, not in the chapter on economic recovery. The
1962 Report states that "if faster economic growth is desired, revision of the
15 Two othermeasures, the Area Redevelopment Act enacted in May
1961 and the Public Works Acceleration Act enacted in September 1962,
were designed to aid areas with particularly high and persistent
unemployment. Whether these programs should be viewed as anti-
recessionary acts or general anti-poverty measures is unclear. However,
neither program was very large.25
tax structure is called for, to permit a higher rate of investment once full use
of resources is achieved" (1962, p. 132). While the Report points out that
increased investment will stimulate aggregate demand, this does not seem
to be the primary motivation behind the program. Thus this often noted
Kennedy fiscal stimulus appears to have been primarily motivated not by the
1960 recession, but rather by supply-side issues related to long-term growth.
The motivation for the even more famous 1964 tax cut appears to
be a mixture of concern about sluggish growth and concern about incentives.
it is clear from the 1963 Economic Report, which contains the first
discussion of this proposed tax reduction, that the act was not some grossly
delayed response to the 1960 recession. The Report states that "we
approach the issue of tax revision, not in an atmosphere of haste and panic
brought on by recession or depression, but in a period of comparative calm"
(1963, p. xiii). The Report goes on to argue that:
Only when we have removed the heavy drag our fiscal
system now exerts on personal and business purchasing
power and on the fmancial incentives for greaterrisk-
taking and personal effort can we expect to restore the
high levels of employment and high rate of growth that we
took for granted in the first decade after the war (1963, p.
xv).
While supply-side effects are certainly emphasized, there is sufficient
discussion of under-utilized capacity and unemployment in the 1963 and 1964
Economic Reports that it seems clear that the aggregate demand effects of
the tax cut were also a major factor in the proposal, and in the ultimate
passage of the act in February 1964.
1969. Real output peaked in the third quarter of 1969. The 1970
Economic Report makes it clear that inflation was such an overriding26
concern that the Administration resisted efforts by Congress to increase
spending or reduce taxes. It states: "the best hope of curbing inflation and
restricting the rise in unemployment ...restswith a policy of firm and
persistent restraint on the expansion in the demand for goods, services, and
labor" (1970, p. 22). The one obviously anti-recessionary measure that was
proposed (and ultimately passed in August 1970, shortly after the trough in
output) was the Employment Security Amendments, which provided
additional unemployment benefits once the insured unemployment rate
exceeded 4 1/2% for 3 consecutive months.
In 1971 the Administration sought to run a balanced full-
employment budget. The 1971 Economic Report indicates that the
Administration "strongly resisted program expansion which would
substantially raise commitments for expenditures beyond 1970" (1971, p. 26),
and took no fiscal measures aimed at stemming the recession. There were
some increases in transfer payments because of a change in social security
benefits and an increase in revenue-sharing to the states, but neither of these
measures appears to have been related to the state of the economy.
Therefore, any fall in the high-employment surplus in 1970 and 1971 was
motivated by considerations other than the recession.16
16 Oneambiguity in the 1970 fiscal record concerns the 10% income tax
surcharge implemented in 1968. This surcharge, which was set to expire on
June 30, 1969, was extended in August at the urging of the President to
cover the last 6 months of 1969. In December Congress approved a
reduction of the surcharge to 5%andan extension to June 30, 1970. Given
this record of extensions, the failure to extend the surcharge in mid-1970
could be viewed as an anti-recessionary policy.However, the 1970
Economic Retort does not speak of the expiration in this way. It states that27
In August 1971, more than a year after the trough in the second
quarter of 1970, the Nixon administration proposed the "NewEconomic
Policy." This proposal called for an end to gold convertibility, a 10%
surcharge on imports, a wage and price freeze, and a substantial fiscal
expansion. Among the fiscal changes that were passed by Congress in 1971
were an increase in the personal income tax exemption, the removal of some
excise taxes, a 7% job development credit, and the reinstatement of the
investment tax credit. According to Carlson (1981), the Revenue Act of
1971 reduced annual tax revenues by $8 billion, or 0.7% of GDP. The 1972
Economic Report makes clear that the Administration was well aware that
the economy was already recovering before the New Economic Policy was
proposed. It states: "[The Administration] believed that a more rapid
expansion of the economy than was generally forecast was desirable and
feasible" (1972, p. 21). Thus the fall in the high-employment surplus in 1972
was motivated not by an attempt to end a recession, but by a desire for
more rapid growth.
1973. Real GDP peaked in the fourth quarter of 1973. The
immediate response of the Administration was to do nothing. According to
the 1974 Economic Report, "the budget proposed by the President ...would
inject no fiscal stimulus to push the economy above its average rateof
"the tight expenditure control recommended for the budget for fiscal 1971
is intended to prevent [excessive stimulus caused by the expiration of the
tax surcharge]" (1970, p. 59).28
expansion" (1974,p.29).17ByJanuary 1975, shortly before the trough in
real GDP, the Administration perceived that the economy was in a severe
recession and proposed a one-year tax cut of $16 billion. The Economic
Report for this year refers to it as an "anti-recession tax cut" (1975, p. 7),
and it is clear that there was no motivation other than the recession. The
Tax Reduction Act of 1975 was passed by Congress in March 1975. The
largest component of this act was a rebate of approximately 10% of 1974
personal income taxes, which was paid in May and September 1975. The act
also lowered individual income taxes for 1975 by increasing the standard
deduction and by granting a $30 credit to each taxpayer. The act also
reduced corporate liabilities by a substantial amount, mainly through an
increase in the investment tax credit from 7% to 10%.
There were minor spending changes in 1975 as well. The 1975
Economic Report states that "in response to the.sharp rise in unemployment
in the second half of 1974, two new laws that affect theunemployment
insurance program were enacted in December 1974" (1975,p. 120). The
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act extended unemployment
insurance by 13 weeks, and the Emergency Jobs andUnemployment
Assistance Act gave unemployment benefits to some uncovered workers and
provided for a small public service employmentprogram. These programs
were entirely motivated by the recession. The only major change in
spending that was not unambiguously anti-recessionary was a 7% increase
17 1975Economic Report states that fiscal policy in 1974 was more
contractionary than anticipated because of the revenue-increasing effects of
inflation (1975, p. 60).29
in social security benefits passed in April 1974. Taken as a whole, anti-
recessionary fiscal policy actions were very large in 1975 and explain most
of the fall in the high-employment surplus in this year.
The Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975 extended most of the
personal and corporate tax cuts included in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975
througb the first six months of 1976. The 1977 Economic Report states that
"the objective of fiscal policy in 1976 was to maintain the degree of stimulus
provided during 1975 in order to keep the economy on a course of
moderate, sustained expansion" (1977, p. 69). The Tax Reform Act of 1976
extended many of the 1975 tax changes through 1977.The Ford
administration argued in favor of a permanent extension, and even called for
larger tax cuts, on the grounds that the changes would stimulate investment
and long-term growth (1977, pp. 4-5). Thus it appears that by mid-1976 the
motivation for policy had shifted from anti-recessionary considerations to a
desire to stimulate long-run economic progress.
According to the first Carter administration Economic Report in
January 1978, the Administration wproposed a series of measures intended
to raise the rate of growth of real output in 1977 and 1978 to a pace that
would lead to significant reductions in the unemployment rate' (1978, p. 50).
Among the actions taken were the Tax Reduction and Simplification Actof
1977, which led to net tax reductions of roughly $5 and $10 billion in 1977
and 1978, respectively, largely through increases in the personal standard
deduction and an employment tax credit. A variety of public works, public
service employment, and training programs were funded by the Economic
Stimulus Appropriations Act in the spring of 1977 and were aimed at
stimulating the economy. These spending increases amounted to roughly30
$1 billion in 1977 and $7 billion in 1978. The motivation for all of these
programs was clearly to increase growth from an already moderate level.
For example, the President's section of the 1978 Economic Report states
that "I have begun from the premise that our economy is basically healthy,"
and that the "American economy is completing three years of recovery from
the severe recession of 1974-75" (1978, p. 3).
1980. The 1980 recession began in the first quarter of 1980 and
ended in the second. The Carter administration, apparently chastened by
increases in inflation during its first years in office, took no expansionary
fiscal actions in response to the downturn. The 1981 Economic Report
states:
twice in the last decade the tendency for government to
stimulate the economy somewhat too freely during the
recovery from recession probably played a role in retarding
the decline of inflation or renewing its acceleration. That
is why I was so insistent that a tax cut designed for quick
economic stimulus not be enacted last year (1981, p. 8).
In fact, inflation was seen as such an overriding problem that Carter
proposed tightening fiscal policy in January 1980, when the Economic
Report noted "that a mild recession is widely forecast" (1980, p. 9). The
Administration believed that "this austere budget policy, accompanied by
supportive policies of monetary restraint, is a necessary condition for
controlling inflation" (1980, p. 6).18
18 The1981 Economic Report emphasizes that the fall in the high-
employment surplus in 1980 was not deliberate. Rather, it was due to the
"delayed effect on individual tax refunds and fmal settlements from the
Revenue Act of 1978" and "to large increases in interest outlays caused by
record high interest rates" (1981,pp. 156-157).31
1981. Following a brief recovery in the late 1980 and early 1981, the
economy slipped into another recession in the third quarter of 1981. This
recession lasted until the third quarter of 1982. Fiscal policy changes in the
first year of the Reagan administration were enormous. The Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 reduced both personal and business taxes
substantially. In addition to the tax reductions, federal spending rose
substantially, mainly because of increases in real national defense purchases
(as measured by the National Income and Product Accounts) of 6% in 1981
and 7% in 1982.
Despite its name, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 appears
not to have been motivated by the recession. The 1982 Economic Report
states that Hthe major elements of the Administration's economic policy are
designed to increase long-term growth and to reduce inflation. Uniformly
favorable near-term effects were not expected" (1982, p. 24). It specifically
identifies the Economic Recovery Tax Act as one of those long-term
policies, and the short-term stimulatory effects are never mentioned (1982,
p. 44). Even the 1984 Economic Report only mentions the aggregate
demand effects of the tax cut in the context of discussing why the deficit is
not an immediate danger to the economy (1984, p. 39).
There is similarly little emphasis on the short-term stimulatory
effects of the increase in defense expenditures. The 1982 Economic Report
makes it clear that national security was the main motive behind the
spending program when it states that "any economic effects, however, must
be assessed in the context of the overriding need for maintaining the level
of defense spending necessary for national security" (1982, p. 85).
Furthermore, the main short-term effects that were contemplated were32
bottlenecks and price increases in industries that supply defense goods (1982,
p. 86). Thus it appears that fiscal changes in 1981-82 were almost entirely
motivated by factors other than the recession.
1990. The most recent recession began in the second quarter of
1990 and ended in the first quarter of 1991. Fiscal policy was essentially
unchanged during the recession. One explanation for this absence of
discretionary fiscal policy is that the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act had
been passed in November 1990. Given its stress on "credible and systematic"
policies (1991, p. 4), the Bush administration did not want to change fiscal
policy so soon after the budget agreement.19 The only significant fiscal
action proposed in 1991 was a cut in the tax rate on long-term capital gains,
and this measure was defeated in Congress.
According to the 1993 Economic Report, "when the need for a fiscal
policy that would provide immediate stimulus became increasingly clear in
late 1991," the Bush administration proposed several small fiscal changes
(1993, p. 51). Among the measures taken were executive actions to reduce
personal income tax withholding and to accelerate the spending of previously
appropriated Federal funds. Legislation to reduce the capital gains tax, to
provide for a temporary investment tax allowance, to enhance depreciation
for certain companies, and to provide for a temporary tax credit for first-
time homebuyers was also proposed. None of theseprograms were very
large, however, and none were passed by Congress.
19The1993 Economic Report states that "the Budget Enforcement Act
of 1990, the ongoing defense downsizing, and a political stalemate between
the Administration and the Congress played important roles in keeping fiscal
policy from being more stimulative" (1993, pp. 55-56).33
2. Lessons from Postwar Fiscal Policy
This analysis of the motivations of policy suggests some important
facts about postwar fiscal policy. First, there is abundant evidence that
limited fiscal stimulus can be undertaken rapidly.2° Either slightly before
or concurrent with most troughs, there were small increases in government
spending that were motivated almost entirely by the state of the economy.
This suggests that the small falls in the high-employment surplus to GD?
ratio around troughs documented in Section II were mainly the result of
anti-recessionary policy.
The nature of these rapid spending changes, however, provides
insight into why the changes were almost always quite small. The spending
increases have typically been limited to actions that can be taken without
Congressional approval, such as the acceleration of planned spending or tax
refunds, or to actions for which Congressional approval is easy to obtain,
such as the extension or expansion of unemployment insurance benefits.
Since the number of such actions is inherently limited by the structure of the
American government, it would be unrealistic to infer from the modest
increases in spending around postwar troughs that equally rapid but more
aggressive fiscal responses were possible.
The postwar record on major legislated anti-recessionary actions is
complicated. There are no examples of major spending changes undertaken
20 (1993) reaches a more pessimistic conclusion about the speed
with which even small fiscal actions can be taken. This difference is
attributable mainly to the fact that Bartlett concentrates on public works
programs, rather than on all spending and tax programs undertaken toend
recessions.34
in response to recessions. There are, however, two times when taxes were
cut in response to recessions: 1953 and 1975. (Taxes were also cut during
the 1981 recession, but there is no evidence that this cut was motivated by
the cyclical condition of the economy.) But both tax cuts were unusual in
ways that may limit their relevance to other recessions. In 1953, the tax cut
had already been passed before the recession began; all Eisenhower had to
do was not ask that it be delayed. In 1975, the recession was particularly
long; it had already been going on for over a year before any policy action
was taken. A more positive interpretation of the 1975 experience, however,
is that in response to a particularly severe recession, effective measures can
eventually be taken. Consistent with this positive interpretation is the fact
that the lag between when the tax cut was officially proposed and when the
first rebate actually appeared was only five months.
Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from this analysis
is that most large fiscal actions have been taken in response to slow
recoveries rather than to actual recessions. The 1964 tax cut, Nixon's "New
Economic Policy," and Carter's tax cut and spending increases were all
passed to increase growth in a sluggish, but basically healthy economy. This
fact is significant because the potential for policy mistakes, for overheating
the economy and generating inflation, is much higher for such policies than
for those passed in the depth of recession.
Finally, the record of the specific actions taken in response to
recessions suggests that focusing on the high-employment surplus is likely to
lead, if anything, to overestimates of the extent of anti-recessionary fiscal
stimulus. Most of the actions took the form of temporary tax cuts,
temporary changes in transfers, and changes in the timing of disbursements,35
all of which may have much smaller effects than long-lasting changes in
purchases or taxes.
N. THE CONTRIBUTION OF POLICY TO RECOVERIES
As Sichel (1992) and Beaudry and Koop (1993) document,
recessions are typically followed by periods of very rapid growth. For the
eight recessions since 1950, real growth in the four quarters after the trough
has averaged 4.6%, and has exceeded the average annual postwar growth
rate of 2.75% in every recovery except the current one.21 In this section
we attempt to measure the contribution of policy to this spurt of rapid
growth following troughs. In particular, we ask whether in the absence of
policy actions, output growth after troughs would have continued to be
negative, been equal to its average postwar value, or been even higher than
it actually was.
To measure the role of policy, it is clearly not enough to just
establish how monetary and fiscal policy changed during recessions and
recoveries; we also need estimates of the magnitude and timing of the
policies' effects. Therefore, in this section we construct such estimates and
analyze their implications. We do not attempt to shed new light on the
underlying question of whether monetary and fiscal policy have real effects.
21Wecalculate average growth over the period 1953:2 to 1993:2, which
is the sample period used in our subsequent calculations. Throughout,
percentage changes are computed as changes in logarithms.36
For this exercise we take it as given that policy affects output, and seek to
provide plausible estimates of the size of those effects.
A. Estimating the Effects of Policy
1. Baseline Policies
Any description of how policies have affected the course of the
economy must compare the economy's actual behavior with how it would
have behaved if policies had followed some baseline paths. Thus the
analysis requires specifying baseline policies. We take as our baselines a
constant real federal funds rate and a constant ratio of the high-employment
surplus to trend GDP. Thus we are attempting to estimate the contributions
of changes in the real funds rate and in the ratio of the high-employment
surplus to trend GDP to the path of real output.
These baseline policies are approximately feasible. Unpredictable
movements in expected inflation, and in receipts and expenditures for a
given level of activity, make it impossible for policy-makers to keep the real
funds rate and the high-employment surplus to trend GDP ratio exactly
constant. On a quarterly basis, however, these shocks are likely to be small.
This would not be true of some other potential baselines; quarterly shocks
to the money supply and to the unadjusted deficit, for example, appear to
be large.
Over the longer term, there is no reason that fiscal policy cannot
keep the high-employments surplus to trend GDP ratio roughly constant.
Monetary policy, on the other hand, cannot keep the real interest rate above
or below its long-term equilibrium level indefinitely without causing37
explosive inflation or deflation. But movements in the sustainable level of
the real interest rate are likely to be gradual. Thus attributing movements
in the real interest rate that are in fact due to changes in its sustainable level
to changes in monetary policy will not have a large effect on the analysis of
the sources of short-run output movements.22
2. Approaches to Estimating the Effects of Policy
We estimate the effects of monetary and fiscal policy in three ways.
The first two approaches are based on simple regressions, and the third is
based on a large macroeconomic model.
Our first regression is an OLS regression of real GDP growth on
eight lags of the change in our estimate of the real federal funds rate and
on the current and eight lags of the change in the high-employment surplus
to GDP ratio. We also include a constant, a dummy variable for the post-
1973 period (to account for the productivity growth slowdown), and eight
lags of the dependent variable.23
22 This wouldnot be true if we took a coLstant nominal funds rate as
our baseline. Attempting to peg the nominal rate at an unsustainable level
would lead to explosive movements in inflation, the real rate, and output.
Thus attributing shifts in the nominal rate that are in fact due to changes in
its sustainable level to changes in monetary policy would have very large
effects on the analysis of the sources of output movements.
We exclude the current value of the change in the real funds rate on
the grounds that the real rate is likely to respond to output movements
within the quarter. Since this appears less likely with the high-employment
surplus to GDP ratio, we include the contemporaneous value of that
variable. Treating the two policy variables symmetrically has little effect on
the results, however.38
The OLS estimates are likely to provide conservative estimates of
the effects of changes in the real interest rate. Most importantly, if the
Federal Reserve changes the real funds rate on the basis of information
about future output movements beyond that contained in the right-hand side
variables of the regression, the changes in the real rate will be positively
correlated with the crror term. As a result, the OLS estimates will be
biased upward (that is, toward zero). Since, as Section III describes,
monetary policy responds very rapidly to economic developments, this effect
is likely to be present to some extent. Similarly, any additional information
that consumers have about future output movements will cause the real rate
to rise before increases in output, again biasing the OLS estimates of the
effects of changes in the real rate toward zero.
Contemporaneous interaction between changes in the real rate and
output growth has more complex effects on the OLS estimates. Since simple
examples suggest that such interaction is likely to also bias the estimates
toward zero, and since the reaction of output to the real interest rate within
the quarter is likely to be small in any event, this effect is unlikely to reverse
the effects of the other biases.
Thus the OLS estimates seem much more likely to understate than
Suppose the true model is iy =a0Exr+a1&..1+bLiy..i+
= ayt+aiLyi+tri+e,wherethe c's are independent white-
noise shocks, aij and a1 are negative, a0 is positive, b is positive (reflecting
the positive serial correlation of output growth), and is negative (reflecting
the negative serial correlation of changes in the real interest rate). For this
case, one can show that the true effect of a change in tr on output growth
in the subsequent period is larger (in absolute value) than what one would
obtain from an OLS regression of 'Yt on and LYt.,i39
overstate the effects of changes in the real funds rate. Since there are
important sources of variation in real interest rates, such as concern about
inflation and political considerations, that are not likely to be substantially
correlated with sources of output movements not included in the regression,
the bias may not be serious. And for fiscal policy, where major policy shifts
appear to require at least several quarters to implement, and where there
are many important sources of variation in policy other than economic
conditions, significant correlation with the error term appears unlikely. Thus
for fiscal policy the bias from using OLS is likely to be small.
Because of the potential bias of the OLS estimates, our second set
of estimates of policies' effects are derived from IV estimation of the
regression above, with the changes in the real rate treated as endogenous.
As instruments, we employ the Romer and Romer (1989, 1994) and Boschcn
and Mills (1992) indexes of Federal Reserve policy. We use 16 lags both of
the Romer-Romer index and of the change in the Boschen-Mills index.
The Romer-Romer index is a simple dummy variable equal to one
on dates of apparent shifts by the Federal Reserve to policies designed to
reduce inflation from its current level. Because these shifts to anti-
inflationary policy appear to be largely the result of changes in tastes, and
not responses to additional information about future output movements, the
index should be essentially uncorrelated with the error term of the
regression. Thus the Romer and Romer dates should allow the IV
regression to estimate the output effects of interest rate changes. The
Boschen-Mils index described in the previous section is a less-than-ideal
instrument because Boschen and Mills do not distinguish Federal Reserve
actions that are independent of the economy from those that are responses40
to the predicted behavior of the economy. However, if one believes that
most changes in stated Federal Reserve intentions represent independent
policy shifts, then this index is a useful instrument for isolating the effects
of policy-generated changes in interest rates.
Both the OLS and IV regressions are estimated over the period
1957:2 to 1988:4; the sample period is dictated by the availability of the
Boschen-Mills index. To derive policy multipliers from these regressions, we
use the coefficient estimates to calculate the dynamic multipliers for a one
percentage point fall in the real federal funds rate and a one percentage
point fall in the high-employment surplus to GDP ratio.
Our third set of estimates of policies' effects are from the Data
Resources Incorporated (DRI) model of the U.S. economy. Using a large
macroeconomic model has the advantage that it incorporates a great deal of
information and judgment. It has the disadvantages, however, that it is
much less transparent than the regressions and that its implications may
reflect the model-builders' priors rather than characteristics of the data.
For monetary policy, the experiment we consider in the model is a
permanent one percentage point change in the real federal funds rate with
the parameters governing fiscal policy held fixed. For fiscal policy, we
consider a permanent change in personal income taxes of one percent of
GDP with the real funds rate held fixed?
For fiscal policy, we also investigated averaging the multipliers for a
change in taxes with those for a change in government purchases. This
resulted in a considerably larger effect in the quarter of the policy change
and had little effect thereafter. Because most major postwar anti-
recessionary fiscal actions have taken the form of changes in taxes and41
3. Results
Figure 3 shows the multipliers for monetary policy implied by the
two regressions and by the DRI model. The OLS regression implies that a
permanent one percentage point fall in the real funds rate raises real GDP
by 1.7%. Most of this effect comes between the second and fifth quarters
after the increase. As one would expect, the IV regression implies a
somewhat larger impact. The overall effect is now a rise in real GDP of
3.6%; the timing is similar to that with OLS? The DRI model implies
a rise in real GDP of 1.1%, with most of the effect coming between one and
four quarters after the change.
Figure 4 shows the estimated multipliers for fiscal policy. The OLS
regression implies that a permanent fall of one percentage point in the ratio
of the high-employment surplus to trend GDP raises output by 1.1%. The
effect occurs gradually over about ten quarters. The IV estimates imply that
the effects of lowering the surplus to GDP ratio are small and irregular.
Taken literally, the estimates imply that fiscal policy has essentially no
effects. However, because the standard errors are large, the IV regression
transfers, we focus on the multipliers for a change in taxes.
We also estimated the IV multipliers using as instruments only the
Romer-Romer index and the exogenous right-hand side variables. The
results are very similar to those shown in Figure 3. The implied multiplier
for a one percentage point rise in the real federal funds rate reaches a
maximum impact on real GDP of 4.3 percent after 12 quarters; the timing
is the same as that for the OLS and basic IV regressions. Because the
Romer-Romer index is a dummy equal to one on only a small number of
dates, the point estimates for the limited IV regression are substantially less
precise than those from the standard version.42
does not provide strong evidence against conventional views of the effects
of fiscal policy. For example, the two standard error confidence interval for
the sum of the coefficients on the surplus to GDP ratio is (-1.59, 1.70); for
comparison, the OLSestimateis -0.74. We therefore do not place great
emphasis on the point estimates of the effects of fiscal policy from the IV
regression. Finally, the DRI model implies that the effect of a fall of one
percentage point in the surplus to GDP ratio on real GDP peaks after four
quarters at 1.4% and then gradually declines.
B. Implications for the Source of Recoveries
Table 6 summarizes the implications of these estimated multipliers
for the sources of output growth in the four quarters after troughs.
Specifically, for each of the three sets of multipliers, the table reports the
implied average contributions during these periods of macroeconomic
policies and other factors. The policy contributions are divided both
according to whether they reflect monetary or fiscal policy and according to
whether they reflect actions before the peaks in real output or actions
afterward. In addition, the contributions of fiscal policy are divided into the
effects of automatic and discretionary policy. The reason for separating the
effects of pre-peak and post-peak policies is that the multipliers suggest that
the lags in the effects of monetary policy are sufficiently long that the shifts
to tighter monetary policy before peaks continue to depress growth even
after troughs. Thus what we need to understand is not simply why output
growth is above normal in recoveries, but why it is above normal despite the
previous monetary tightenings.
All three sets of estimates imply that the reductions in real interest43
rates after peaks are crucial to recoveries. The OLSmultipliersimply that
these reductions have added an average of 1.6 percentage points to real
growth during the first year of recoveries, the IV multipliers imply that they
have added 3.0 percentage points, and the DRI multipliers imply that they
have added 1.5 percentage points. Thus the estimates imply that the
declines in real interest rates in recessions are large enough, and their
effects occur quickly enough, that they play a critical role in the rapid growth
during recoveries. Since average output growth in the year following troughs
is 4.6%, the OLS estimates imply that without these declines, growth in the
year after troughs would average only 3.0%; the IV estimates imply that it
would average just 1.6%; and the DRI estimates imply it would average only
3.1%.27
The OLS and DRI estimates imply that discretionary fiscal
27Ourcalculations assume that the changes in the real funds rate
resulting from the Federal Reserve's consistent responses to recessions have
the same real effects as other movements in the real funds rate. This
appears to be a reasonable approximation, for two reasons. First, since the
Federal Reserve adjusts the real funds rate rapidly to economic
developments, both the recession-related and the remaining part of
movements in the real funds rate have a large unanticipated component to
them. Second, for the real interest rate (in contrast to the money supply),
there is no clear reason for unanticipated and anticipated changes to have
very different effects. As described in Section II, the fact that systematic
Federal Reserve policy affects the nominal funds rate, together with the fact
that the direction of the effect is that expansionary policy lowers the nominal
rate, strongly suggests that the systematic component of policy affects the
real rate as well. It is possible, of course, that a larger movement in the
money supply is needed to bring about a given change in the real funds rate
when the movement is the result of systematic policy; but this is not relevant
to our calculations.44
expansions after peaks contribute moderately to growth (not surprisingly,the
IV estimates imply that the effect is negligible). In both cases, however,the
majority of the estimated effect comes from the recoveryfrom the 1973-75
recession. In addition, because the changes in discretionary fiscal policy in
recessions have consisted disproportionately of temporary changes in taxes
and transfers, the multipliers are likely to overstate their effects. Thus
discretionary fiscal policy has played at most a small role in recoveries.
Our estimates imply that automatic changes in fiscal policy are more
important. As described in Section II, there are consistent andsubstantial
changes in the automatic component of the surplus duringrecessions. As
a result, the OLS estimates suggest that the automatic movementsin fiscal
policy after peaks add an average of 0.6% to growth in the first yearof
recoveries, and the DRI model suggests that they add 0.9%.
Together, these results imply that policies undertaken during
recoveries are crucial to strong recoveries. All three sets of estimates
suggest that without these policies, growth during the first yearof recoveries
would be anemic. The OLS estimates imply that it would have averaged
2.1%, the IV estimates imply 2.0%, and the DRI estimates imply 1.4%. Our
results suggest that the main source of the weak growth that would occur
without the post-peak changes in policy is the monetary tightening that
usually occurs before peaks. The first column of Table 6 suggests that pre-
peak monetary policy reduces growth in the year after troughs by roughly
1%.
Non-policy factors appear to have little effect on growth in the year
following troughs. The fmal column of Table 6 shows the amount of above-
average growth not accounted for by pre-peak or post-peak policies.While45
thisresidual varies somewhat depending on the multipliers used, it is
typically small, implying that growth would have been approximately average
during the first year of recoveries in the absence of policy changes. Thus
nothing in our analysis suggests that output would continue to drop
indefinitely without governmental intervention. Similarly, nothing suggests
that the economy possesses strong self-correction mechanisms that would
cause it to quickly make up the output losses that occur during recessions.
Considering slightly longer horizons strengthens the case that
monetary policy is critical to recoveries. For example, output growth (at an
annual rate) in the fifth and sixth quarters of recoveries averages only 0.1
percentage points above normal; but the OLS multipliers imply that post-
peak monetary policies contribute 1.4 percentage points to annual growth in
these quarters, the IV multipliers imply that they contribute 3.1 percentage
points, and the DRI multipliers imply that they contribute 0.2 percentage
points?
We also investigated the implications of using multipliers from the
MPS model maintained by the Federal Reserve Board. The MPS model
implies very gradual, but very persistent, effects of monetary policy on real
output. This response occurs mainly because the nominal long-term rate is
assumed to adjust gradually to the nominal short-term rate. This gradual
adjustment causes the real long-term rate to fall essentially linearly in
response to a permanent change in the real funds rate. As a result, the
change in the funds rate has very little effect on output in the first year, and
a nearly permanent effect on output growth thereafter. The model therefore
suggests a very different view of the source of recoveries than any of the
estimates considered in the text. The MPS multipliers, like the OLS and
DRI ones, imply that fiscal policy contributes moderately. But the extreme
lags in the effects of monetary policy in the model mean that the monetary
expansions undertaken during recessions have only a modest effect on46
C. Implications of an Alternative Baseline
The preceding analysis takes a constant real federal funds rate as
the baseline monetary policy, and therefore describes output movements
resulting from changes in the real funds rate as beingdue to monetary
policy. But there are other possible baselines.In a conventional textbook
model where the Federal Reserve is targeting the growth rate of the money
supply, nominal interest rates would declinein a recession because of the
fall in income and because of the increase in the real money supply resulting
from the fall in inflation. The effect on real interest rates wouldbe
mitigated, however, by the decline in expected inflation.
The magnitude of these effects depends on the interest and income
elasticities of money demand. Following the standard practice in the money
demand literature, assume that money demand takes the form
(1) In m =a+bin y -cin i +- d+AIn mgi,
where m is real money balances, Yt is real income, i is the nominal interest
rate, and ,r is inflation. Equation (1) implies that a declinein y with m held
fixed reduces in i by (b/c)L in y, and therefore reduces i by approximately
(b/c)[t In yji. Similarly, it implies that a fall in the price levelwith the
nominal money stock held fixed reduces i by approximately (1/c)(1-d)
in p]i in the initial period and [(1-A)/c][L in p]i in subsequent periods.
Goldfeld and Sichel (1990), Judd and Scadding (1982), and others suggest
growth during the first year of recoveries. As a result, themodel implies
that non-policy factors are the critical source of recoveries.47
that reasonable values of the parameters in (1) are b =0.12,c =0.05,
d =0.7,and A =0.8.These values imply long-run income and interest
elasticities of 0.60 and -0.25, respectively.
To estimate the effect of the recession on interest rates when money
growth is held fixed, we need measures of the falls in output, prices, and
expected inflation due to the recession. We compute the fall in output
between the peak and the quarter following the trough due to the recession
(the t In y term in the expression above) simply as the sum of the shortfalls
of quarterly output growth from its average value of 2.75%/4, or 0.69%.
These values of the change in y, together with the estimates of b and c and
the actual values of the nominal interest rate, imply that if the Federal
Reserve did not adjust the money growth rate, the falls in real income would
reduce the nominal interest rate by an average of 0.6 percentage points over
the period from the peak to one quarter after the trough.
To fmd the effect of the recession on the price level, we compare
the actual path of the price level with what would have occurred if inflation
had simply held steady at the value of expected inflation implied by our
estimated real federal funds rate as of the peak quarter. These estimates
imply that the increases in the real money supply coming from the declines
in inflation reduce the nominal interest rate by an average of 0.5 percentage
points. Thus the textbook self-correction mechanism of downward pressure
on prices increasing real money balances and therefore lowering interest
rates accounts for only a small part of the interest rate declines during48
recessions.29
Finally, the estimates of expected inflation implied by our real funds
rate series suggest that expected inflation declines by an averageof 1.4
percentage points between the peak and the quarterafter the trough. The
fact that the direct effects of the declines in expected inflation more than
offset the effects of the increases in the real money stock resulting from the
falls in inflation is consistent with the evidence of De Long and Summers
(1986) that price flexibility is on net destabilizing in the U.S. economy.
Combining these three figures, our results suggest that if the
Federal Reserve were holding money growth fixed, the behavior of income,
prices, and expected inflation would lead to only small falls in the nominal
interest rate between the peak and the quarter after the trough, and have
essentially no effect on the real interest rate. Thus choosing a baseline for
monetary policy that takes account of these effects would not affect our
conclusion that monetary policy is the primary engine of recovery from
recessions?
An alternative way of computing the effect of the recession on the
price level would be to combine the figures for the decline in output with
standard estimates of the Phillips curve (for example, Gordon, 1990). Doing
this yields a slightly larger implied reduction in nominal interest rates.
By describing any changes in the real interest rate that are not due to
changes in income, prices, and expected inflation as changes in monetary
policy, the baseline policy implicit here is money targeting that
accommodates any shifts in the money demand function. A natural
alternative choice of the baseline would be pure money targeting. We do
not pursue this possibility for two reasons. First, there have been large
shifts in money demand, most of which were largely accommodated by the
Federal Reserve. Second, the results are potentially sensitive to the49
V. STABILIZATION AND PERSISTENCE
Our analysis of the contribution of macroeconomic policy to output
growth can be used to address two other issues. First, we can examine the
overall role of macroeconomic policy in economic stabilization. Even if
policy has contributed to recoveries, it is useful to consider its effects in
other periods.Second, we can investigate the extent to which the
persistence of overall output movements derives from the persistence of
policy changes and their effects.
A. The Overall Record of Stabilization Policy
Our estimates of the contributions of policy to output growth can
be used to construct estimates of what the path of real output would have
been if policy had held the real interest rate and the high-employment
surplus to GDP ratio constant. Figure 5showsthe implied paths of real
output under policies of a constant high-employment surplus to GDP ratio
and a constant real funds rate, together with its actual path, for the three
sets of multipliers. Since, as described above, monetary policy cannot in fact
hold the real rate constant indefmitely, no great significance should be
attached to the longer-term movements in the difference between the
implied and actual paths. But the shorter-term swings can be interpreted as
largely representing the effects of policy.
The OLS multipliers suggest that departures from the baseline
specification of what it means for the Federal Reserve to continue with
"normal" money growth during recessions.50
policieshave generally made recessions more severe, and recoveries more
rapid, than they otherwise would have been.The estimates imply, for
example, that the 1960 and 1969 recessions would not haveoccurred at all
under the baseline policies, and that the output declines in the 1973 and
1981 recessions would have been half as large as they actually were.These
estimates suggest that the one major success of active policy occurred in the
last few years: since growth has been weak despite a falling real funds rate,
the estimates imply that there would have been a protracted and severe
recession under the baseline policies.
The IV multipliers suggest a generally similar picture. They imply,
however, that in addition to preventing a major downturn over the pastfew
years, active policy preventedextended periods of approximately zero growth
in the mid-1950s, mid-1970s, and mid-1980s. Finally, the DRI multipliers
imply that the 1953 and 1960 recessions would not have occurred underthe
baseline policies, that the 1969 and 1973 recessions would have occurred
later and been slightly more severe, and again that the 1990 recession would
have been much longer and larger.
This overall record of stabilization policy suggests that policy,
especially monetary policy, helped to both start and stop postwar recessions.
Since both inflation control and output growth are generally considered valid
goals of macroeconomic policy, it would be hard to fmd consensusthat
either of these uses of policy was inappropriate. Given that throughout most
of our sample period inflation was at levels that (both at the time and in
retrospect) were viewed as excessive, it is arguable that low output growth
was likely to be needed at some time to reduce inflation.The only issues
concern the timing and speed of disinflation. Similarly, when output growth51
is low and inflation is low or falling, most economists would probably agree
that expansionary policy is appropriate. Thus the tightening and loosening
of policy around recessions and recoveries are hard to question.
In contrast, expansionary policy taken in face of a strong economy
and of inflation that is high or rising might be generally viewed as mistaken.
By this standard, three times stand out as periods when policy was overly
expansionary. 1967-68, 1972, and 1986-87. Growth was above normal in all
three periods. Unemployment was also low to moderate in each case: 3.6%
in 1967-68, 5.5% in 1972 and 6.5% in 1986-87. Yet both the OLS and IV
multipliers imply that policy was adding considerably to real grwth in all
three periods. Averaged over these five years, the OLS multipliers imply
that monetary policy contributed 1.2% to real growth and discretionary fiscal
policy contributed 0.5%. The same numbers for the IV multipliers are 2.4%
for monetary policy and 0.2% for discretionary fiscal policy. The DRI
multipliers also imply that monetary policy contributed substantially to
growth in these years, with an average contribution of 0.6% per year. These
multipliers imply, however, that discretionary fiscal policy had an offsetting
effect of -0.7%, so that the overall contribution of policy was essentially zero.31
31 AsFigure 4 shows, the DRI model implies that a decrease in the
surplus to GDP ratio has a negative effect on growth beginning in the fifth
quarter after the decrease. These delayed contractionary effects are the
main source of the model's implication that fiscal policy reduced growth in
1967-68, 1972, and 1986-87. When these effects are omitted, the DRI
multipliers imply that discretionary fiscal policy contributed just -0.1% to
average growth in these years. The delayed contractionary effects of fiscal
policy are also the main source of the estimated moderate contribution of
pre-peak automatic and discretionary fiscal policy to output growth in
recoveries reported in Table 6.52
Thenature of the expansionary policies differs across the episodes.
The 1967-68 and 1986-87 episodes involved moderately stimulative policies
at relatively late stages in expansions. The stimulus in the 1967-68 period
stemmed from reductions in the high-employment surplus in 1965 and 1966
and from an absence of consistent changes in the nominal federal funds rate
in the face of rising inflation over the period 1965-67. The stimulus in 1986
and 1987 was the result of a general downward trend in both the high-
employment surplus and the nominal federal funds rate, together with slight
upward movements in inflation. The 1972 episode, on the other hand,
resulted from extremely expansionary monetary policy in the wake of the
mild 1969 recession. In the three quarters after the recession ended in the
second quarter of 1970, the nominal federal funds rate fell from 7.88% to
3.86%. It fluctuated irregularly over the next year, reaching a low of 3.54%
inthe first quarter of 1972. Since inflation was, if anything, rising over this
period, the result was that monetary policy was extremely stimulative.
Despite the differences in the nature of policy across these episodes, they
are united by the fact that expansionary policies stimulated an already strong
economy and thus set up the inflation that ultimatelyinduced later
tightenings.
B. The Persistence of Output Fluctuations
A large recent literature examines the persistence of output
movements. The general conclusion of this research is that quarterly
changes in real GDP are highly persistent. The usual presumption. in
interpreting these fmdings, either implicit or explicit, is that output
movements driven by shifts in aggregate demand will not be highly persistent53
(seefor example Nelson and Plosser, 1982, and Blanchard and Quah, 1989).
As a result, the conclusion that has been drawn from these studies is that
supply-side disturbances must be a crucial source of fluctuations.
Our examination of postwar monetary and fiscal policy and their
contributions to output movements suggests that the presumption underlying
this conclusion should be reexamined. There are extended periods when
macroeconomic policy --particularlymonetary policy --iseither generally
expansionary or generally contractionary. And our estimates of policies'
effects imply that the impact of any given policy movement on theeconomy
is quite protracted. Thus monetary and fiscal policies' contributions to
output movements may be highly persistent.
To examine this issue formally, we perform a bivariate experiment
analogous to the univariate one performed by Campbell and Mankiw
(1987a). Campbell and Mankiw estimate some simple processes for overall
output growth, and then use these processes to address the question of how
forecasts of the path of output should be revised inresponse to an output
innovation. Analogously, we decompose output growth into the estimated
contributions of discretionary policy and of other factors, and then ask how
one should revise the forecasted path of output in response to innovations
in each of these two components.
Specifically, we estimate a bivariate vector autoregression (VAR)
using these two variables with four lags, and then fmd the effects of shocks
to each of the variables. The sum of a shock's effects on policy-related and
non-policy related growth represents its effect on the path of output growth.
Cumulating these growth effects then gives its effect on the path of the log
of total output.54
The results suggest that output innovations stemming from
macroeconomic policies have considerably more persistent effects than
innovations coming from other sources. Consider for example the results
when the OLS multipliers are used to estimate the component of output
growth that is due to monetary policy and discretionaryfiscal policy, and
thus to decompose output growth into policy and non-policy components.
The VAR implies that the overall output effect of a 1% shock to the non-
policy component of output peaks at 1.3% two quarters after theshock and
then gradually declines. The effect returns to 1% after 6 quarters, and is
0.7% after 12. This relatively low persistence occurs because the policy
component of output growth responds negatively tothe non-policy
component: policy-makers respond to positive outputinnovations by
tightening. The overall effect of 0.7% after 12 quarters, for example, reflects
a contribution of +1.5% from the non-policy component and an offsetting
contribution of -0.8% from the policy component.
The results imply that independent changes in the policy component
of output growth, in contrast, have extremely persistent effects. A 1%
innovation raises overall output by 2.3% after 4 quarters and 2.4% after 12.
This strong persistence arises both because the policy component of growth
is highly serially correlated and because the non-policy component is
essentially unresponsive to the policy component. The strong serial
correlation of the policy component, in turn, stems from the facts that the
estimated effects of real interest rate changes are quite protracted and that55
thereal interest rate reverts to its mean only slowly.32
Using the IV and DRI multipliers to decompose output growth into
the policy and non-policy components produces generally similar results.
The IV multipliers imply that a 1% innovation to growth stemming from
sources other than policy raises the level of output after 12 quarters by
0.8%, while a 1% innovation to the policy component raises output after 12
quarters by 1.9%. With the DRI multipliers, the figures are 1.2% and 2.4%.
Thus these alternative sets of multipliers continue to imply that the policy-
induced output movements are considerably more persistent than other
output movements.
Taken together, the results using all three sets of multipliers suggest
that the source of the high degree of persistence of aggregate output
fluctuations may be quite mundane. Rather than reflecting fundamental
characteristics of fluctuations, it may simply reflect the fact that shifts in
macroeconomic policy and their effects on the economy are often quite
32It is of course possible that the output effects of a shock to the policy
component of output are eventually reversed. Indeed, our procedure for
estimating the effects of policy imply that if shocks to the real interest rate
and the surplus-to-GDP ratio are eventually completely undone, the long-run
effect of a shock to the policy component of output is zero. As is well
known, however, data from moderate time spans can shed little light on the
effects of innovations at long horizons, and conventional estimates of the
persistence of fluctuations (such as Campbell and Mankiw's) reflect effects
at moderate rather than long horizons (see for example Christiano and
Eichenbaum, 1990). For that reason, we focus on the effects of innovations




Our central conclusion is that monetary policy alone is a sufficiently
powerful and flexible tool to end recessions. In nearly every postwar
recession, policy-makers have been quick to discern the onset of recession
and have responded to the downturn with rapid and significant reductions
in nominal and real berest rates. Plausible estimates of the sizc and speed
of the effects of these interest rate cuts suggest that they were crucial to the
subsequent recoveries.
Discretionary fiscal policy, in contrast, does not appear to have had
an important role in generating recoveries. Fiscal responses to economic
downturns have generally not occurred until real activity was approximately
at its trough. In addition, these responses have generally been limited to
small actions that could be undertaken without Congressional approval or
for which Congressional approval was easy to obtain. As a result, our
estimates suggest that fiscal actions have contributed only moderately to
recoveries. Policy-makers have succeeded in making large adjustments in
Our results are consistent with the findings of Campbell and Mankiw
(198Th) that the component of output movements that is correlated with
movements in the unemployment rate is at least as persistent as general
output fluctuations. West (1988) shows that a largely conventional model
can imply that fluctuations driven by aggregate demand movements are
relatively persistent.57
fiscalpolicy in response to recessions only in unusual circumstances. Thus
the historical record contradicts the view that fiscal policy is essential to
ending recessions or ensuring strong recoveries.
While monetary policy has been crucial to postwar recoveries, our
results suggest that the overall record of discretionary monetary and fiscal
policy is less impressive. One apparent error that has been made on several
occasions is for policy-makers to become overly concerned about the
possibility of weak growth during expansions, or excessively optimistic
concerning the prospects for expansion without triggering inflation, and
therefore to adopt excessively expansionary policies. The commonpattern
during recoveries is for there to be modest increases interest rates and little
change in the high-employment surplus. However, in periods where policy-
makers have been concerned about low growth, they have often undertaken
major fiscal expansions, or have kept nominal interest rates constant or
declining in the face of rising inflation. On several occasions, such
expansionary policies appear to have contributed substantially to above-
normal growth.
Finally, our analysis of the effects of policy may help to explain the
persistence of movements in aggregate output. We find that the large
degree of persistence of movements in real GDP appears to result to a
considerable extent from extremely high persistence of the contribution of
policy changes. Thus policy is not only the source of postwar recoveries, but
also the source of the puzzling serial correlation inaggregate output.58
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209.TABLE 1
THE FEDERAL FUNDS RATE IN RECESSIONS
Date of Peak 53:2 57:3 60:1 69:3 73:4 80:1 81:3 90:2
Quarter Relative CHANGE IN NOMINAL RATE (Percentage Points)
to Peak
+1 -0.03 -0.01 -0.24 -0.04 -0.67 -2.36-3.99-0.08
+2 -0.03-1.37 -0.76 -0.37 1.93-2.85 0.64-0.42
+3 -0.37-0.92 -0.64 -0.69 0.84 — 0.29-1.32
+4 -0.39 — -0.29 -1.18 -2.74 — -3.51 -0.56
+5 0.22 — — — -3.04 — -1.72
+6 — — — -0.88
Cumulative Change,
Peak to Quarter
After Trough -0.59-2.30-1.93-2.28-4.58 -5.21 -8.29-2.38
Quarter Relative CHANGE IN REAL RATE (Percentage Points)
to Peak
+1 0.46-0.08-0.46 -0.15-1.11 -1.11-0.15-0.P
+2 0.61 -0.21 0.56 0.25 0.90-1.88 -0.21 -0.13
+3 0.20-0.83-0.08-0.45 1.32 — 1.13-1.19
+4 -1.84 — -0.11-1.21-2.66 — -1.47-0.96
+5 -0.03 — — — -2.40 — -1.98 —
+6 — — — — -1.16
Cumulative Change,
Peak to Quarter
Alter Trough -0.60 -1.11-0.08-136-5.10-2.98-2.68-2.40
Note: Data for quarters after the first quarter after the trough are not reported.TABLE 2
THE FEDERAL FUNDS RATE IN RECOVERIES







CHANGE IN NOMINAL RATE (Percentage Points)
0.02 0.38-0.27 -1.14 0.74
0.29 0.84-0.06 -1.71-0.75
0.16 0.40 0.72 0.71-039















1 to 5 Quarters
After Trough 0.30
036 -0.36 -0.60 0.11 1.18 2.97 0.55-0.21
-0.48 0.39 -0.62 -0.83-0.27 0.42 0.35 -0.06
0.12 0.42 0.32-0.79 0.08 1.37-0.17-0.28
0.10037 0.19 0.19 1.29-0.10 0.22-0.37
1.02-0.71 -1.33 2.27 4.67 0.95 -0.93
Cumulative Change,
I to 5 Quarters
After Trough 0.90 2.14TABLE 3
TIlE HIGH-EMPLOYME!ff SURPLUS IN RECESSIONS AND RECOVERIES
Date of Trough 54:2 58:1 60:4 70:2 75:1 80:2 82:3 91:1
Quarter Relative CHANGE IN RATIO OF HIGH-EMPLOYMENT SURPLUS
to Trough TO TREND GDP
(Percentage Points)
-4 — — — — 0.31 — —
-3 0.70 — — — 0.02 — -0.39 —
-2 -0.99 — -0.29 0.24030 — 0.17034
-1 1.41 -0.71 -0.31 -0.22-0.69 — -0.15-0.65
0 132 0.45-0.14-0.80-0.18 0.06 -0.66-0.00
+1 0.25-0.99-0.27-0.29-3.23 -0.03 -0.70-0.15
+2 0.64-0.10-0.27 0.12 2.18 -0.00 0.26 0.47
+3 0.41 -0.07 0.08 -0.01 -0.09 0.77 -0.05 -0.37
+4 0.43 0.77-0.08-0.36 0.38 -0.05 -0.85-0.31
+5 -0.26 0.20-0.72 0.16 0.40 -0.16 -0.27-0.03
Cumulative Change,
Peak to Quarter
After Trough 2.89 -1.25 -1.00 -1.08-3.28 0.02-1.74-0.26
Cumulative Change,
1 to 5 Quarters
After Trough 1.21 0.80 -0.99 -0.09 2.88 0.55 -0.92-0.23
Note: Data for quarters prior to the peak are not reported.TABLE 4
THE AUTOMATIC SURPLUS IN RECESSIONS AND RECOVERIES
Date of Trough 54:2 58:1 60:4 70:2 75:1 80:2 82:3 91:1
Quarter Relative CHANGE IN RATIO OF AUTOMATIC SURPLUS
to Trough TO TREND GDP
(Percentage Points)
-4 - -0.46
-3 -0.32 — — — -0.19 — -0.48 —
-2 -0.35 — -0.29-0.34-030 — -030 -0.37
-1 -1.41 -0.59-0.22 -0.41-0.44 — -0.18-0.12
o -0.84 -1.01 -0.51 -0.41 -1.08-0.90-0.30 0.85
+1 0.47-0.15-0.08 0.01 0.07-0.32-0.27 -0.84
+2 -O.1 0.33 0.11-030 0.08 0.30-0.03-0.62
+3 0.72030 0.17 0.35 0.12 0.13 0.40-0.04
+4 0.18 0.26 0.37-0.18 0.34-0.17 0.40-0.06
+5 0.22 0.35 0.21 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.43-0.08
Cumulative Change,
Peak to Quarter
After Trough-2.45-1.76-1.09 -1.16-2.60-1.22 -1.74 -0.49
Cumulative Change,
1 to 5 Quarters
After Trough 1.00 1.44 0.86-0.37 036 0.27 1.21 -0.80
Notes: Data for quarters prior to the peak are not reported.TABLE 5
ThE BOSCHEN-MILLS INDEX IN RECESSIONS AND RECOVERIES
Date of Trough 54:2 58:1 60:4 70:2 75:1 80:2 82:3 91:1
Quarter Relative
to Trough













































Notes: Data for quarters prior to the peak are not reported. The Boschen-Mills index is not
available for the 1991 recession. A positive change in the Boschen-MiIls index indicates a
move toward expansion; a negative change indicates a move toward contraction.
-4 — — — — 0.33
-2.33-2.00-0.67 naTABLE 6
ESTIMATES OF ThE CONTRIBUTIONS OF MONETARY ANDFISCAL POLICIES






matic Source of tionarymatic tionary
FiscalFiscal
MultipliersMonetary FiscalFiscal Monetary
OLS -0.92-0.18 -0.01 139 0.25 0.63 0.45
IV -2.05-0.00 -0.03 3.00 0.02-0.41 1.30
DRI -0.14 0.27 0.14 1.48 030 0.85 -1.30
Notes: The residual shows the component of the difference between mean growthin the year
after troughs and average annual growth that is not accounted for by pre-peakand post-peak
policies. The difference between mean growth after troughs and averageannual growth is 1.82
percentage points; the rows may not add to this value due to rounding.U
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